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Are Chinese businesses part of a grand strategic plan of the
Chinese government in Africa? Certainly, there is evidence
that there is a strong link between China’s domestic policy
and its ﬁrms’ outward investment behaviors. However, this
link is unfolding in quite a distinctive and complicated way.
The Chinese state itself is changing, adapting both to glob-
alization and the inexorable logic of its own market-oriented
reforms. Consequently, contrary to the assumption of a
strong, directive, collusive state, in the African context at least,
many Chinese enterprises do not have much knowledge or
understanding of the state’s policies relating to ‘‘going global”
and investing in Africa. This means there is no singular ‘‘state–
business relationship” or form of Chinese state capitalism.
Rather, there are multiple versions, depending on the origins
of the business investor and the particular role of the provin-
cial state. A picture emerges of a highly fragmented and often
quite ambiguous political-economic framework for China’s
state–business relations in African agriculture. This results
from the diﬀering logics and often divergent interests driving
the central government, the provinces and the business com-
munity, each with diﬀerent stakes in African agriculture. This
is compounded by a lack of strong and enduring forms of
coordination across the wide array of governmental and cor-
porate agencies.
This paper addresses issues related to the role of Chinese
state and business in China–Africa agricultural cooperation.
This role is highly controversial with the debate between those
who see China’s role as unequal, rapacious, and even colonial
(e.g., Tull, 2006; Askouri, 2007; Clinton, 2011) and those who24see the relationship as one of mutual beneﬁt (e.g., Asche &
Schu¨ller, 2008; Fantu & Cyril, 2010).
For critics, China is simply the latest in a long line of capri-
cious, self-interested ‘‘benefactors”, whose presence undermi-
nes the domestic and export potential of local produces,
distorts the local market, transfers little of substance to the
local political economy in terms of knowledge or skills trans-
fers, oﬀers little in the way of meaningful employment and is
restrictive—even abusive—in enclave silos protected by Chi-
nese security service personnel, thereby limiting transparency
and accountability. China’s ‘‘soft loans” (i.e., weak on the
conditionalities often associated with Western donor develop-
ment assistance) are accused of allowing proﬂigate African
states to build up unsustainable levels of debt, retain weak
ﬁnancial, economic, and political governance and, in some
instances, continue infringements of human and civil rights.
Proponents, however, argue that the evidence shows that
China provides substantial, much-needed investment, partic-
ularly critical infrastructure capacity-building in transport
and communications. Chinese ﬁrms bring technical and com-
mercial know-how and widen market access. Projects get
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attached.
In this paper we argue that neither of these views stand up to
any detailed scrutiny. By understanding the complex relation-
ships between the state and diﬀerent business operations, we
explore how Chinese national state interests are reﬂected in
China’s ‘‘development” role in Africa. We examine how Chi-
nese state capitalism works through intimate state–business
relations, with the government operating hand-in-hand with
state-owned enterprises and, less overtly or directly, with the
many Chinese private ﬁrms ‘‘going-out” to Africa. In the con-
text of agricultural investments in two African countries, we
explore how these relationships bring ﬁnancial and practical
infrastructural, production, trade, and investment beneﬁts,
as well as new challenges.
Chinese state–business relations are, we argue, key factors in
explaining China’s engagement in Africa, but our understand-
ing of the Chinese ‘‘state” and ‘‘business” sectors needs to
move beyond simplistic portrayals. The Chinese state’s rela-
tionship with business is populated by a wide range of com-
mercial, diplomatic, and ﬁnancial interests operating at
multiple levels of government. Similarly, there are diverse
business organizations from State-Owned Enterprises to fully
private ﬁrms. Both the state and business also have a local
character, with diverse forms found in diﬀerent parts of China,
across its provinces. In other words, the core message is that
there is not a single Chinese ‘‘state capitalism”, but many,
and these are all playing out in Africa in diﬀerent encounters,
relationships, and negotiations.
This paper provides a closer understanding of this more
complex landscape. It demonstrates the diversity of factors
inﬂuencing Chinese state–business relations in the context
of agricultural investments in Africa. It presents a more
nuanced insight into Chinese ‘‘state capitalisms” as they
play-out in this sector in Africa, with a focus on Zimbabwe
and Mozambique.
Three key research questions are addressed:
1. What are the roles of the Chinese state and business
actors in their engagement in Africa?
2. How, and to what extent, are Chinese businesses in
Africa regulated and constrained by the Chinese central
state and inﬂuenced by provincial states?
3. What are the implications of local level encounters in
terms of shaping and inﬂuencing the ways in which Chi-
nese state–business led development operates in
practice?
The paper is based on work carried out in 2012–14, and
involved in-depth case study work in Mozambique and Zim-
babwe, involving both Chinese and African researchers, com-
bined with key informant interviews with business
representatives and government oﬃcials in China. Fieldwork
was complemented by a review of documentary material on
Chinese policy, as well as particular interventions.2. CHINESE STATE CAPITALISM IN AFRICA
China’s role in Africa has proven to be highly controversial
and the character of Chinese state capitalism in Africa has
generated a great deal of interest and debate (e.g., Taylor,
2009; Brautigam, 2009; see Scoones, Amanor, Favareto, &
Qi, 2013; Scoones, Cabral, & Tugendhat, 2013; Amanor &
Chichava, 2016). Increasingly, however, there is more recogni-
tion of the diversity, disaggregation, and lack of coordinationbetween China’s state and business organizations both within
China and as part of African involvement.
At the same time, the focus has departed slowly from per-
ceiving Africa as passive recipient, emphasizing the active role
of African governments in negotiating development invest-
ment (Mohan & Lampert, 2013; Scoones, Amanor, et al.,
2013; Scoones, Cabral, & Tugendhat, 2013); a move contextu-
alized by the African Union’s new vision and strategy, Agenda
2063. As the ECA argues in relation to the BRICS countries,
‘‘The continent also needs to be assertive when negotiating,
and to pursue all areas of cooperation to stimulate production
and entrepreneurial development (ECA, 2013, pp. 3–4).”
The widespread portrait of China’s state–business relations
in Africa is of state-directed, collusive behavior. This is said
to be most evident in Chinese SOEs acquiring the critical
resources needed to sustain China’s economic growth and in
Chinese manufacturers taking advantage of lower cost labor
to supply burgeoning consumer demand. In this perspective,
the Chinese state’s role in Africa is to use a wide range of
diplomatic instruments and substantial state ﬁnance to facili-
tate the access and operations of Chinese business. However,
in practice the story is more complex. The Chinese state’s eco-
nomic strategic priorities retain institutional inﬂuence on Chi-
nese business, but, in practice, Chinese ﬁrms have substantial
agency, and negotiate diﬀerent opportunities within Africa,
depending on local contexts.
The Chinese state’s role vis-a-vis Chinese business in Africa
is, undoubtedly, substantial; but it is contextual, rather than
directive in character. There are four principal dimensions.
Firstly, the state’s policy framework provides the context,
authority, and legitimacy for Chinese ﬁrms to go to Africa.
Here the key policies are the ‘‘Africa Policy” and ‘‘Going-
global” policy. 1 Secondly, the state has established a strong,
dedicated, inter-locking institutional network of agencies at
home to support Chinese ﬁrms ‘‘going out” to Africa.
Together these provide not only robust practical support for
businesses, but also oﬀer demonstrable evidence of long-term
commitment and policy durability. Thirdly, the Chinese state
has engaged in unprecedented economic diplomacy in Africa.
This has two aspects: multilateral (pan-African) and bilateral
(state-to-state) diplomacy. The former is driven through the
FOCAC framework, a dialog and institutionalized process
for cooperation established in 2000. The latter is driven by
extensive tours of African states by Chinese state and party
oﬃcials and bilateral cooperation agreements on everything
ranging from loans, guarantees, and technical assistance to
cultural exchanges and educational scholarships. Fourthly,
Chinese business also beneﬁts from the warmer relations gen-
erated by the Chinese state’s wider political diplomacy evident
in South–South Dialogue and Cooperation and in the United
Nations. China has presented itself as a leading voice of the
developing world, critical of traditional donors (Amanor &
Chichava, 2016).
The Chinese government has introduced a series of policies
and supporting measures to encourage ﬁrms to explore and
invest in Africa. These include 11 Chinese investment and
trade promotion centers established in African countries
intended to provide information and ancillary services for Chi-
nese ﬁrms. Major Chinese policy banks such as the China
Development Bank and the China Export and Import Bank
and commercial banks such as the Chinese Construction Bank
and Chinese Industry and Commerce Bank have established
operations across Africa (Gu, 2011). In 2009, the then Premier
Wen Jiabao stated that: ‘‘We should hasten the implementa-
tion of our ‘going out’ strategy and combine the utilisation
of foreign exchange reserves with the ‘going out’ of our enter-
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trial policy strategy is part of China’s proactive diplomacy.
It is designed to encourage and support ﬁrms with compara-
tive advantage to invest overseas. It goes back to 1998 and
became part of the Five-Year Plan for National Economy
and Social Development in 2001. It is designed to meet the
challenges of over-capacity in production within the Chinese
economy and to strengthen processes of industrial structural
adjustment (Shambaugh, 2013).
The ‘‘Going Out” strategy includes a range of practical mea-
sures to promote overseas investment such as ﬁnancial support
and information dissemination. The Chinese government pro-
vides a range of state-sponsored promotion factors for Chi-
nese private investment under its ‘‘going global” strategy,
including special and general tax incentives, credit and loans,
and a favorable import and export regime. However, many
incentives are generally of a symbolic, supportive character
and do not amount to huge ﬁnancial sums.
By the Third Plenum of the 18th Congress in November
2013, the position of the CPC was that ‘‘China should encour-
age ﬁrms and individuals to invest abroad. The ﬁrms and indi-
viduals should try their best to pursue international
cooperation. If they can take the risk, they can go anywhere
abroad to develop business. We also encourage land invest-
ment, merger investment, securities investment and joint
investment abroad” (Xinhua, 2013a).
In interviews conducted in China, ﬁrm representatives iden-
tiﬁed the ‘‘Going out” or ‘‘Going Global” strategy, industrial
structural adjustment and transfer of production over-
capacity policy, and trade zones provision as initiatives con-
tributing to the growth and development of their ﬁrms’ busi-
ness in Africa. 2
However, not all companies are encouraged to go out. The
central Government repeatedly stated that only those ﬁrms
that met certain criteria were encouraged. As the private sector
has emerged as the engine of China’s economic growth and
with the ﬂexible character it has when compared to the
state-owned sector, the strategy has experienced a subtle shift
and now also places emphasis on the private sector in going
global. In 2013, the Chinese Exim Bank stated that the central
government, including state-owned banks, would provide US
$1 trillion of ﬁnancing to Africa in the years to 2025 with
the Bank accounting for 70–80% of direct investments, soft
loans, and commercial loans (SCMP, 2013).
The Chinese government contextualises its relationships
with African states within its commitment to the goals of
mutuality and practical technical collaborations at the heart
of South–South Cooperation and Dialogue. The FOCAC
mechanism provides the primary framework for discussion,
negotiation, agreement, and implementation across a wideTable 1. Growth stages of Ch
Stages
Stage one 1949–80s Limited number of Chin
projects
Stage two 1980s–mid 1990s Large national and prov
diplomatic agenda; few
Stage three mid 1990s–2000 Emergence of large state
infrastructure investmen
market
Stage four 2000–05 Expansion of large state
development strategy e.
Stage ﬁve 2005-present Acceleration of private
enterprises; the developm
Source: China–Africa project survey (Gu, 2009).range of ﬁnancial, business, socio-cultural, and development
issues. Of key importance within FOCAC’s institutional
infrastructure is the China–Africa Development Fund (CAD
Fund), set-up in 2007 to encourage and support Chinese cor-
porate investment in Africa. By 2013, it had already funded 72
projects in 30 African countries. According to Wang Yong,
CAD Fund Vice-President, the immediate aim from 2013
onward was to accelerate investment activities in Africa, con-
centrating on manufacturing (in particular, industry parks),
infrastructure, and agriculture ‘‘as these sectors are more cru-
cial in terms of increasing the capacity of economies of the
African continent, which in turn beneﬁt the Fund” (Xinhua,
2013b, p. 1). For many Chinese businesses, however, the prin-
cipal sources of information about Africa have been through
friends or networking introductions and through businesses’
own research and trading experiences (Gu, 2011).
Table 1 below demonstrates that Chinese companies in
Africa have passed through a number of growth stages.
China’s relations with Africa in the immediate post-
revolutionary era were, necessarily, restricted by the pressing
demands of national reconstruction as well as the shifting,
sometimes turbulent, political conditions within China. How-
ever, with the reform era, and the ‘opening’ of the Chinese
economy, there has been growing demand for resources and
markets. This contributed to the establishment of new trading
relationships and greater experience and knowledge of Africa
and its markets, leading on to Government encouragement
and support for direct investment projects and to growing
numbers of ﬁrms more conﬁdent in ‘going out’ to this last
‘‘Golden Land” (Gu, 2011) (see Table 1).
The Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), the State-Owned
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the
State Council (SASAC), provincial governments, private
enterprises, and Chambers of Commerce all frame China’s
state–business relations. MOFCOM 3 has the main responsi-
bility for policy coordination and implementation in respect
of all foreign aid and trade-related issues. 4
However, beyond the central state, a key feature has been
the growing signiﬁcance of the provinces. According to one
recent assessment, there are approximately 100,000
sub-national SOEs and these operate in a highly diversiﬁed
architecture of provincial government regulations, of which
inter-provincial barriers to mergers and acquisitions are an
example (Szamosszegi & Kyle, 2011, p. 26). Bremmer (2009)
argues that there are three primary actors in Chinese state cap-
italism: state-owned enterprises, privately owned national
champions, and sovereign wealth funds. Lin and Milhaupt
(2013, p. 701) call the organizational structure of Chinese state
capitalism a ‘‘networked hierarchy”. The networks facilitate
information ﬂow, foster collaboration in production andinese companies in Africa
Main features
ese companies, mainly implementing Chinese oﬃcial development
incial level state-owned trading companies, closely associated with
private companies
-owned enterprises mainly seeking natural resources strategic assets, and
ts; increasing number of private companies start exploring African
-owned enterprises and private companies; emergence of clustering
g., trade zones; industry parks
companies in various sectors and continued expansion of state-owned
ent of clustering industry strategy
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ers within the system, because success in business leads to
rewards in the political realm and vice versa. Thus, as Xing
and Shaw (2013, p. 95) argue, ‘‘Chinese state capitalism is a
distinct form of state capitalism shaped and determined by
its internal political reality and characterised by the active
state intervention and corporative state–business relations”.
The past decade has seen Chambers of Commerce become a
factor of growing importance in China’s economic develop-
ment and commercial diplomacy: ‘‘These organisations are
changing the structures by which China is governed and policy
is made” (Fewsmith, 2005, p. 1). In the context of the privati-
zation and the market reform process of the Chinese economy,
Chambers of Commerce have played an intermediary, regula-
tory role between the state and business (Yu, 2002; Jin, 2003;
Yu, 1993; Huang, 2005) and, as discussed below, are also play-
ing an increasing role in Africa.
How then does this evolving domestic state–business rela-
tionship play out in the practice of Chinese involvement in
African agricultural development? What roles do the diplo-
matic and commercial missions, the oﬃcial face of the Chinese
state, play?3. CHINA IN AFRICAN AGRICULTURE
‘‘In terms of Chinese agricultural engagement in Africa, it is more about
politics and international relations, rather than agriculture per se”. 5
China has been providing substantial agricultural assistance to
African countries since the 1950s. The FOCAC Addis Ababa
Action Plan (2004–2006) built upon this historic tie by making
agriculture a priority sector, with China emphasizing the cen-
tral importance it placed upon agricultural cooperation. The
2006 FOCAC Forum also saw China’s practical commitments
increase signiﬁcantly. The speech by the then Chinese Presi-
dent Hu Jintao identiﬁed ‘‘eight steps” of assistance to African
countries. These made speciﬁc reference to the deployment of
100 agricultural experts to Africa (including to Ethiopia,
Ghana, and Zimbabwe) and the establishment initially of 10
agricultural technology and demonstration (Xu et al., 2016).
Agricultural investment to Africa, as an important part of
agriculture ‘‘going out” strategy, has also become a priority
of China’s FDI in Africa. By the end of 2009, China’s invest-
ment in Africa Agriculture had reached US$290 billion,
accounting for 3.1% of China’s total investment to African
countries. Besides the MOFCOM, other ministries, including
the Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Science and Tech-
nology, contribute their expertise on agriculture-related areas
including provision of technical expertise and training (see
Tugendhat & Alemu, 2016).
‘‘One Province, One Country” is China’s new aid model
advocated by FECC in recent years, which is being applied
widely, not only to China’s agricultural aid to Africa, but also
tomedical aid and other aid areas. It means one province within
China should be responsible for China’s development coopera-
tion in one recipient country, such asHubei toMozambique and
Anhui to Zimbabwe. For this province, implementing the aid
task is not only economic, but also a political task. For example,
although the selection of project contractors is through open
tendering, the process is not completely transparent or market
oriented. The bidding notice and announcement from MOF-
COM or MOA is usually directed to each provincial govern-
ment, and it is then up to the provincial government to
recommend some enterprises or institutions that qualify for
the work with its province to join the bidding.To understand how Chinese business investments play out
on the ground, we now turn to examine the Chinese engage-
ment in Mozambique and Zimbabwe.4. CHINA’S RELATIONSHIPS WITH MOZAMBIQUE
AND ZIMBABWE
(a) Mozambique
China’s relationship with Mozambique has a long history.
China established diplomatic relationships with Mozambique
in 1975 when Mozambique gained independence from Portu-
gal. The post-independence relationship ebbed and ﬂowed,
however, recently the relationship has been steady and increas-
ingly close (Alden & Chichava, 2014). As a country with rich
natural resources and currently a relatively stable political
environment, Mozambique has become one of the top destina-
tions for Chinese investment in Africa. China has become
Mozambique’s second largest investor since 2008. China is
Mozambique’s third largest trading partner. Chinese Govern-
ment statistics indicate Mozambique’s imports from China
were worth US$2 billion, while its exports were estimated at
US$1.6 billion (StarAfrica, 2015).
Most of Mozambique’s exports to China are resources such
as minerals, oil, timber, and agricultural products. However,
China’s primary contribution has been in infrastructure and
construction, with the writing-oﬀ of US$22 billion debt, provi-
sion of new loans and social construction projects such as
schools, hospitals, and scholarships to train or study in China.
China’s Ambassador to Mozambique claims China has
funded 26 construction projects and 17 loans and 1,100
Mozambicans have been trained in various Chinese institu-
tions (AP/FoxNews, 2014).
Economic relations were given a critical boost in 2001 with
the signing of a Trade Agreement on the Promotion and
Reciprocal Protection of Investment, and establishment of a
Joint Economic and Trade Commission. Mozambique’s agri-
cultural sector is a long-standing priority in the bilateral rela-
tionship. In 2002, the Sino-Mozambican Economic and
Technological Cooperation Agreement was concluded and a
Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation between the
Chinese Ministry of Agriculture and the Mozambican Min-
istry of Agriculture and Rural Development was also signed
(Chichava, 2010).
China’s agricultural engagement in Mozambique strength-
ened in September 2005, when one of the members of the
Political Bureau of CPC Central Committee, also a Party Sec-
retary of Hubei Provincial Party Committee, visited Mozam-
bique and developed an agreement on Sino-Mozambique
agriculture cooperation. Hubei Province in China and Gaza
Province in Mozambique became ‘‘Friendship Provinces”
and, at the request of Mozambican government, the Hubei
government invested in a farm called the Hubei-Gaza Friend-
ship Farm. In 2010 a US$50 million concessional loan from
China Exim Bank targeted several agricultural projects. The
ﬁrst US$30 million, placed under the management of the
Gabinete do Plano de Desenvolvimento da Regia˜o do Zam-
beze (GPZ), was used to build three agro-processing factories
(cotton, rice, and maize) in the provinces of Manica, Zambe´-
zia, and Tete, respectively. The remaining US$20 million was
used to import agricultural equipment from China. In 2012
Mozambique signed another long-term credit line from China
Exim Bank of US$60 million to develop an agricultural pro-
ject in Chokwe. The project called the Chokwe Agro Process-
ing Complex aims to develop several projects in particular rice
28 WORLD DEVELOPMENTprocessing factories and cattle breeding and processing facto-
ries as well as a conservation unit (Chichava, 2014a; see
Amanor & Chichava, 2016).
Since 2009, with the start-up of China’s Agricultural Tech-
nology Demonstration Centre (Xu et al., 2016), more and
more Chinese agricultural companies went to Mozambique
to seek new business opportunities. Among these companies,
Wanbao Grain and Oil from Hubei Province, has invested
more than US$200 million in Gaza province, and is running
the largest rice farm in Africa. China–Africa Cotton has been
conducting large-scale contracting farming in Sofala
province. 6 Several other companies, including China–Africa
Agriculture Investment Company Ltd. and China National
Agricultural Development Group Company Ltd. are all work-
ing in Mozambique.
(b) Zimbabwe
China’s relations with Zimbabwe and, speciﬁcally Robert
Mugabe’s ZANU-PF, date back to the independence struggle
(Chan & Primorac, 2013). Zimbabwe is among the top four
African countries for approved agricultural projects with Bei-
jing (Brautigam & Zhang, 2013, pp. 16–83).
As with Mozambique, China has remained a partner to
Zimbabwe since independence in 1980, providing loans, guar-
antees, and other ﬁnancial support, most importantly after
western nations began sanctions following Zimbabwe’s land
reform in 2000. China was one of the ﬁrst countries to estab-
lish an embassy in independent Zimbabwe. Since 2000, Zim-
babwe has been forced to ‘‘look East” and engage its ‘‘all
weather friend”, resulting in intensiﬁed diplomatic and com-
mercial activity.
China’s economic interest lies in Zimbabwean mining (such
as diamonds and platinum deposits), agriculture, infrastruc-
tural development, and communications technology. Recogni-
tion of China’s willingness to invest politically as well as
ﬁnancially in the continuing relationship was demonstrated
in Zimbabwe securing major extensions of loans from the
China Exim Bank worth US$700 million in 2011. The loan
extensions were intended to help revive Zimbabwe’s health,
mining, and agriculture sectors. The loans included US$342
million for an agricultural machinery scheme, US$99.5 million
for medicine, and US$144 million for the renovation of sewers
in Harare. Visiting Harare, the then Chinese Vice-Premier
Wang Qisha commented that: ‘‘China will continue to support
and grow your economy. China will continue to impress on
countries that have imposed sanctions to lift them at an early
date” (China Daily, 2011). China later extended a US$36m
loan to Zimbabwe, but questions have been raised around fur-
ther support. China is heavily exposed to debt default, as it has
provided Zimbabwe with over US$1 billion in concessionary
and preferential loans. It has also given Zimbabwe US$100
million in grants and interest-free loans. China refused to
underwrite the Zimbabwe government’s ‘‘ZimAsset” eco-
nomic growth plan, and approaches by senior ZANU-PF
leaders, including the president in 2014 and 2015 were
rebuﬀed, with additional loans becoming conditional on prior
repayment of US$1.5 billion in debt (Mambo, 2015).
According to China’s Ambassador to Zimbabwe, bilateral
trade between China and Zimbabwe grew to over US$1.1 bil-
lion in 2013, up from US$310 million in 2003. The 2013 trade
ﬁgure represented an 8.5% increase over 2012. Zimbabwean
exports were worth US$688 million and Chinese imports val-
ued at US$414 million (CCTV, 2014; Daily News, 2014).
There are about 80 Chinese companies in Zimbabwe, two-
thirds of which are privately owned. 7 The relationshipsbetween Chinese business associations/networks and compa-
nies are extensive. There are seven such networks operating
in Harare, linked to both central and provincial business
associations. 8 Given the number of Chinese companies of
diﬀerent provincial origin, these associations are competing
with each other for inﬂuence. However some have become
prominent on the back of oﬃcial Chinese government sup-
port. This includes the Zimbabwe–China Business Council
Trust, which was established under the auspices of the Zim-
babwe–China Business Council to engage the government in
‘‘creating an enabling environment for entrepreneurship”
and ‘‘enabling the imparting of good business practices to
ensure that Zimbabwe–China business activities contribute
to poverty reduction and human development” (The
Behaviour Report, 2014).
These increasingly powerful players owed much of their rise
to Chinese embassy patronage. According to oﬃcials at the
Chinese Embassy in Harare, regular meetings are held with
business leaders through the Council to discuss issues such
as Corporate Social Responsibility. 9 This close relationship
resulted from an Embassy perception that existing associa-
tions were insuﬃciently responsive to their policy initiatives.
New councils linked to the central state are expected to act
as bridges between the Embassy and the Chinese business
community, helping to communicate government policies
and perspectives. 105. CASE STUDIES: CHINESE STATE–BUSINESS RELA-
TIONS IN MOZAMBIQUE AND ZIMBABWE
In both Mozambique and Zimbabwe, the local state and
party provide special support for Chinese companies. In
Mozambique, high proﬁle political visits have paved the way
for Chinese agricultural investments, and the establishment
of ‘‘friendship farms”. These often have close links to party
elites in Mozambique, aﬀording political protection for the
business ventures (Chichava et al., 2014). In Zimbabwe, most
Chinese companies are all currently exempted, through what
company managers described as ‘‘special agreements”, from
the 2008 Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act that
requires all foreign-owned companies to cede 51% of their
shareholding to ‘‘indigenous Zimbabweans”. In Zimbabwe,
Chinese state enterprises have capitalized on contacts with
Ministry of Defence staﬀ in establishing commercial.
Thus in both countries, the state, the party and a business–
military elite have provided a supportive context for the emer-
gence of Chinese state–backed business ventures, through
both SOEs and private companies, with a variety of links to
Chinese provinces. It is essential to understand this particular
political economy in Africa if the wider pattern of Chinese
state capitalism is to be understood. In the next section, ﬁve
cases are presented that illustrate the particularities and com-
plexities of these dynamics.
The six case studies illustrate the diversity of state–business
relations and the diﬀerent politics that conﬁgure the ‘‘develop-
ment encounters” (Scoones, Amanor, et al., 2013; Scoones,
Cabral, &Tugendhat, 2013). We examine how the companies
negotiated their entry into the country, the companies and
institutions that became involved in this process, their net-
works and connections, the political or ﬁnancial support they
received, and the ways in which such processes were completed
within the political, business, and social contexts of Zimbabwe
and Mozambique. We examine the inﬂuence of diﬀerent
provincial origins, state, or Party sponsorship, diﬀering ways
of engaging with informal business associations and their
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Tugendhat, & Alemu, 2016). This approach enables us to gain
a more nuanced, empirically grounded understanding of state–
business relations in Africa.
(a) Case 1: Zimbabwe–China Wanjin Agricultural Development
Ltd—a ”Role Model” in question
This company is a joint venture between the Anhui Provin-
cial State FRMS Group and the Zimbabwean Ministry of
Defence (MoD). In 2010 the MoD used its bilateral relations
with the Chinese government to establish a joint farming
scheme with an Anhui farm. Its objective was to support
under-utilized Zimbabwean farms to improve their produc-
tion. Farmers who were allocated land under the land reform
program had insuﬃcient capital/savings and skills to fully uti-
lize the land. Through the partnership with Anhui with their
access to funding and experience in commercial farming, it
was envisaged that the land would be more fully utilized. As
of 2014, the venture had 50,000 ha of land under cultivation
with a workforce of more than 200 local employees (50 on
contract) and 14 staﬀ from China. On average, there are 1–2
Chinese managers and 3–5 local Zimbabwean managers on
each farm. Ten staﬀ members are from the MoD, including
the Vice-Manager (holding the rank of General). The Man-
ager, He Hongshun, commented ‘‘the reason we are in Zim-
babwe is due to the Chinese ‘Going Global’ policy”. 11 The
company beneﬁted from the encouragement of the Anhui
provincial government and from the ﬁnancial support of the
China Exim Bank: ‘‘We mainly deal with the Anhui Provincial
Government, not the central government in Beijing”, the man-
ager observed. The company also beneﬁts from a strong net-
work of Chinese construction and manufacturing services
companies from Anhui province that had moved to Zimbabwe
during the last 10 years.
However, the manager also emphasized that the venture
would not have succeeded had it not been under the aegis of
the MoD in Zimbabwe. Without leveraging its linkages to
the Zimbabwean state, the company would have been chal-
lenged to develop partnerships with locals to conﬁrm compli-
ance with indigenization regulations. He also admitted that in
this process, ‘‘entrepreneurial spirit and good communication
with the local community [were] very important; for example,
we helped the local community to dig a well and build a
road”. 12 ‘‘But proﬁts should come ﬁrst, this can then yield
good social impact”, he noted. Wanjin Company, in other
words, still operates as a private proﬁt-making entity. The
manager repeatedly praised the successes of the company,
claiming that the company has achieved proﬁts also furthering
the development goals of its home province, Anhui. This
emphasis on the linkages with the province and, equally, the
emphasis on the successes of the company could potentially
manifest ambitions of being promoted to home-based posi-
tions. Asked if he planned to stay in Zimbabwe, the manager
answered that he wanted to go back to China. Zimbabwe was
not regarded as home, but as foreign land where life was ample
with hardships encapsulated in the Chinese maxim ‘‘chi ku”
(‘‘eat bitterness”).
Contrary to this emphasis on proﬁts by the Zimbabwe-
based manager, the Deputy General Manager of Anhui
Provincial State Farms Group (APSFG) and Chairman of
Wanjin based in Anhui Province, Chen Jun, emphasized devel-
opmental objectives. He commented: ‘‘We do not expect our
investment in Zimbabwe to yield immediate returns. The real
focus for our company is technology transfer and skillsenhancement; factors critical for the long-term success of
agriculture in Zimbabwe. Our primary task is to train as many
local agricultural technicians as possible, as science and tech-
nology hold the key to better results” (China Daily, 2014).
As the provinces compete to attract praise from the central
government in China, reﬂecting leadership ambitions for
promotion in the Chinese state machinery, Anhui provincial
leaders will always emphasize the developmental impacts of
the project.
Opinions about Wanjin’s eﬀectiveness vary. Vice-Chancellor
of Chinhoyi University of Technology, David Jambgwa, sta-
ted that ‘‘The Wanjin project is a good role model for the Zim-
babwean agricultural sector” (China Daily, 2014). Several
farmers suggested that, had the company not operated, they
would have been unable to aﬀord the necessary inputs for cul-
tivation of all the acreage in their possession. 13 An expert
from another company has challenged this rosy picture, how-
ever, saying that ‘‘it is all lies and self-boasting. We all know
that it is diﬃcult for foreigners to make a proﬁt from farming
in a short period in Zimbabwe. They only use farming as a
project to boost their image in order to bring other Chinese
ﬁrms here.” 14
(b) Case 2: China–Zimbabwe agricultural technology demon-
stration centre—a ‘‘Gilded Signboard”
The China–Zimbabwe Agricultural Technology Demonstra-
tion Centre is seen as a practical means for China to provide
agricultural development support (technology and equipment)
in a sustainable way (Xu et al., 2016). ATDCs are run by Chi-
nese companies after being selected through a competitive ten-
der system in China. Although these companies are ﬁnancially
supported by the Chinese state during the ﬁrst years of oper-
ation, they are expected to seek out ways to earn income
and become self-ﬁnancing. They are also encouraged to inves-
tigate other business opportunities (Brautigam & Zhang,
2013).
The China–Zimbabwe Agricultural Technology Demonstra-
tion Centre was opened in 2012, and is located in Gwebi Agri-
cultural College, a government agricultural training center.
The Centre’s managers are mainly from State-owned farms
in Heilong Jiang Province. They do not have close contact
with the local Chinese business association or networks in
Zimbabwe. The ATDC has consistently received the support
of the Zimbabwean Ministry of Agriculture and the Centre’s
manager has regular contacts with senior Ministry staﬀ.
According to ATDC staﬀ, ‘‘The Company uses the Centre’s
name when it performs the function of public services, and
adopts the company’s name when it conducts commercial
operations”. 15 Commercial activities have included selling
farm machinery and farm products and providing plowing
or on-farm services to local farmers.
Two of the managers previously worked for a state-owned
farm in China, which operated under a diﬀerent model. As
one explained: ‘‘The fundamental problem with the ATDC
is that the operating company has not been integrated or hung
together with the Centre; it is the systemic failure of Chinese
agriculture development assistance, one cannot simply extend
the domestic institutions to Africa. Putting Chinese ‘parts’ in
African governmental and society machine cannot improve
the eﬃciency of the machine”. 16
The ATDCs are important platforms for Chinese business
engagements, but given their multiple objectives, there remain
challenges, and many are ﬁnding it tough to operate purely on
a commercial basis (Xu et al., 2016).
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Flue-cured Virginia tobacco is Zimbabwe’s most important
agricultural crop with 98% of the crop exported and it con-
tributes 45% of all agricultural export receipts). Tianze
Tobacco Ltd. is a SOE from Yunnan Province operating in
Zimbabwe. It is a subsidiary of China Tobacco, the Chinese
state-owned monopoly that produces the world’s largest num-
ber of cigarettes with roughly 2.4 trillion cigarettes sold annu-
ally. Most of these cigarette sales are in the Chinese domestic
market. According to Zimbabwe’s Tobacco Industry and
Marketing Board, some 54% of the Zimbabwean tobacco
exports went to China during the ﬁrst quarter of 2015, worth
US$169 million (News Day, 2015). Historically, Yunnan Pro-
vince has been very close to Tianze. Since the reform era, the
province has implemented development policies reﬂecting the
priorities of the central government, orienting mainly toward
economic growth through infrastructural development
(Donaldson, 2013).
Since coming to Zimbabwe in 2005, Tianze has received sup-
port from the central Chinese government through access to
low interest ﬁnance, and they have not suﬀered the liquidity
challenges that have plagued Zimbabwe since ‘‘dollarization”
in 2009 and have hampered the expansion of local companies.
Due to access to more concessionary funding and its reinvest-
ing most of the proﬁts made, the company has become a key
stakeholder in Zimbabwe’s tobacco sector. As the general
manager conﬁrmed, ‘‘Tianze’s ability to succeed in a relatively
short period mainly beneﬁtted from the Chinese market and
ﬁnancial support from the Exim Bank”. 17 This support
enabled the company to become a core player in Zimbabwe’s
tobacco sector in a relatively short time. Zimbabwean state
oﬃcials have been quoted explaining that exemptions were
given to Chinese companies because ‘‘they have been support-
ing our agriculture and our farmers, so we look at those things
when considering whether to exempt them or not” (New Zim-
babwe, 2014).
Tianze’s local manager expressed no incentive to increase
proﬁts: ‘‘It makes no diﬀerence to me if I make one dollar
proﬁt or one million dollar proﬁt, because my salary is always
the same”, 12 reﬂecting the conditions in many SOEs, and the
wider political role played by such companies.
The company has 88 local workers and 10 Chinese staﬀ. The
General Manager, Li, said that he was impressed by the general
quality of Zimbabwean workers. Tianze has good relations
with its outgrowers. A Mashonaland farmer commented:
‘‘They (Tianze staﬀ) help me build up the farm bit-by-bit every
year. If they had left me, I could not have done anything and I
would have not survived” (Xinhua, 2014). Another farmer
chose Tianze because of better service: ‘‘I can visit the head-
quarters of Tianze and talk with Chinese managers, I can also
get technical assistance from the company, such as on agron-
omy and curing, and these technologies are useful. Without
the help of the company, I can’t grow tobacco”. 18
The company is in Zimbabwe for the long haul and has close
links with the Zimbabwean state and with the TIMB and the
Tobacco Research Board (TRB). TIMB board members were
recently sent on a fully paid trip to China to familiarize them-
selves with the tobacco value-chain in Yunnan. Tianze has
also facilitated linkages between the TRB and the Yunnan
Province Tobacco Research Station through which the two
institutions are collaborating in variety development and
germplasm exchange. Tianze has also gained from the close
relationships between the Chinese central state and Yunnan
Province, and the strategic signiﬁcance of a state-owned par-
ent company.(d) Case 4: The China–Africa Cotton (CAC) Company in
Zimbabwe
Cotton is Zimbabwe’s second most important export crop
and supports the livelihoods of over 200,000 households living
in low/erratic rainfall areas. Funding has been provided
almost exclusively through contract farming arrangements
with each farmer obliged to market the crop through the con-
tracting company. Over the last 15 years, the number of cot-
ton merchants that have been supporting farmers have
increased to 14–18, including local companies and multina-
tionals, one of which is China–Africa Cotton (CAC).
CAC is a privately owned company that was established as a
joint-venture between Qingdao Ruichang Cotton Industrial
Co, CAF and Qingdao Fuhui Textile Co. in 2008. The com-
pany now employs more than 3,000 people across Africa with
over 200,000 farmers supplying its cotton. Its proﬁts were US
$6.5 million by 2013. It began operations in Zimbabwe in 2013
and in Sofala Province in Mozambique in 2009. At US$60 mil-
lion, CAF’s investment in the enterprise has been signiﬁcant.
Zhao Jianping, Assistant General Manager at the China
Development Bank, argued that ‘‘this ‘company-plus-farmer
model’ is excellent for promoting sustainable development in
Africa: It not only brings technological support to Africa,
but also introduces management experiences that help
improve local economies” (China Daily, 2014).
CAC is now the second-largest cotton processing company
in Zimbabwe, working with more than 29,000 contract farm-
ers (out of the 200,000). 19 The company beneﬁted a great deal
from its previously established networks in Shandong Pro-
vince. The current owner and the manager come from the
same city, Qingdao, and both accumulated management
knowledge and skills while running SOEs at home. The cur-
rent owner later established his own company in various parts
of Africa, while the current manager in Zimbabwe previously
managed a large textiles company in Zambia, the China–Zam-
bia Mulungushi Textiles Company. He was hired by the
China–Africa Cotton Company to manage the Zimbabwe
operation in 2013.
CAC has also beneﬁted from its networks at home in terms
of its day-to-day operations. As the company has had access
to funding from CAD, it has been able to charge lower interest
rates to cotton farmers in both countries, increasing its com-
petitiveness. A perennial outcry among contracted smallholder
cotton farmers in Zimbabwe has been that the input packages
provided by the merchants have been inadequate and lower
than those recommended by the Cotton Research Institute, a
government institution. In the face of high default rates,
side-marketing, and using contracted inputs on other enter-
prises, merchants have cut down the input pack (especially fer-
tilizers) to reduce their risk exposure. In the 2013–14 season,
farmers applauded CAC for providing a cotton pack with
more fertilizers than other companies and for providing the
inputs earliest in the season.
CAC in Zimbabwe does not have close links with the Chi-
nese embassy, but is a member of the China–Africa Business
Council. CAC has leveraged provincial support form Shan-
dong, ﬁnancing from CAD, as well as long experience in
Africa among its senior Chinese expatriate staﬀ.
(e) Case 5: rice farm in Mozambique—entanglements of state
and business
Based on the MOU signed in 2005 between Hubei and Gaza
provincial governments following high-level political engage-
ments with Hubei oﬃcials (see above; also Amanor &
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Hubei Farming Bureau (HFB) with expertise in managing
large-scale state farms and agricultural projects, to grow rice,
vegetables, and other crops, as a ‘‘friendship farm”. The Gaza
Provincial Department of Agriculture (DPAG) would provide
all the necessary services, as well as oﬀering tax exemptions.
Meanwhile the Hubei Farming Bureau (HFB) would develop
the land, improve the infrastructure, help local producers
improve their yield and transfer Chinese technology to them.
Hubei–Gaza Friendship Farm was established in Xai-Xai,
the capital city of Gaza province in 2007. To manage the
new initiative, a new company was incorporated, Hubei Lian-
feng, with 18 state farms in Hubei province as its shareholders.
An all-Chinese staﬀ was selected as part of HFB’s hiring sys-
tem by Hubei Lianfeng in China. Since then, Hubei Lianfeng,
a state-owned enterprise, has worked in Xai-Xai focusing on
rice farming, as well as adaptive breeding of Chinese varieties
and training local farmers. This ‘‘friendship farming” is not
proﬁt-driven, and many interviewees wondered how long the
relationship could persist.
In 2011, with the request of Mozambican government to
enlarge the scale of land cultivation and farmer training, Wan-
bao Grain and Oil, a private agricultural ‘‘dragon-head”
enterprise from Hubei province, was introduced to join the
project to scale up the existing Friendship Farm. Wanbao
Grain and Oil is a private company based in Xiangyang and
focuses on purchasing, storing, processing, sale, and logistics
of grains and oil seeds. It is not directly involved in the pro-
duction at the farm level. It was ﬁrst established in 1952 as a
state-owned company and restructured as a private-owned
stockholding company in 2004. To meet the requirement of
expanding its international grain market, the company has
actively participated in investments overseas. At present, the
company has ﬁve subsidiaries, including Wanbao Africa-
Agricultural Development Project. Wanbao African Agricul-
tural Development Co., Ltd. has been registered in Mozam-
bique with 49% of the company shares owned by China
Agricultural Development (CAD) Fund.
In May 2011, Mr. Chai, the Chairman of Wanbao went to
Mozambique and decided to move forward with the invest-
ment. He explained the decision was easy to make because
of his conﬁdence in Chinese rice growing technologies and
his perception of abundant natural resources, inexpensive
labor and huge market potential in Mozambique. 20 Soon
after, Wanbao Africa-Agricultural Development Company
Ltd. (Wanbao) was established for the purposes of implement-
ing the investment in Mozambique. Wanbao made arrange-
ments to partner with a local Mozambican counterpart,
Regadio do Baixo Limpopo (RBL), a public company in
charge of local irrigation schemes and land use that had previ-
ously worked with the Friendship Farm. In a contract between
the two parties, RBL was charged with contracting 20,000 ha
of farmland in Xai-Xai to Wanbao, organizing local farmers
for training, and supporting implementation of the project.
Wanbao came with an estimated investment of more than
US$ 200 million, aimed at creating the largest rice farm in
Africa (Chichava, 2014a, 2014b). Wanbao rented the original
1,000 ha of the Friendship Farm from Hubei Lianfeng, and
was granted a 50-year concession to an additional 20,000 ha
at US$1/ha/year. Wanbao contracted the China National
Chemical Engineering (CNCEC)-6th Company, a Chinese
state construction company, to work on the infrastructure
construction, and four Chinese state farms to implement the
large-scale farming activities. 21
Wanbao also works with local farmer associations, facili-
tated by local political connections. The Association of Farm-ers and Irrigators for Agri-Livestock Development and
Mechanisation in Xai-Xai (ARPONE) was established partic-
ularly to learn Chinese technology and work with the new Chi-
nese farms. Most members were connected to local political
elites, with the arrangement between the expanded farm and
local oﬃcials very strong (Chichava, 2014a, p. 5. Contracting
Chinese state farms to do the production indeﬁnitely is expen-
sive for Wanbao. In the future, they aim to rely on the
Mozambican farmers, cementing the connection between the
investment and local elites.
By 2014, 11,000 ha of land were under production in Xai-
Xai, representing more than US$100 million of investment.
Some 70 ha of land with the best location and facilities were
set aside for training local farmers, with 68 families trained,
and about 300 ha were designated for ARPONE members.
The various companies involved have employed about 700
Chinese workers, including managerial staﬀ, construction
workers, and technicians and about 2,000 local workers,
including staﬀ working in construction, farm workers, cooking
staﬀ, and oﬃce workers. The successful expansion of the
Friendship Farm in such a short period has earned prestige
for the company. Armando Emilio Guebuza, then President
of Mozambique, visited the farm three times in less than
2 years. Wanbao is trailed by the Chinese government as a
successful overseas business in Africa. As one of the managers
of a Chinese State Farm in Tanzania told us, ‘‘Every time we
join the meeting organized by our government, we are urged to
learn fromWanbao”. 22 The expansion in the scale of land cul-
tivation of Wanbao would not have been as successful without
the committed political support from both Mozambican and
Chinese governments, especially the provincial government
of Hubei in China.
(f) Case 6: China–Mozambique Agricultural Technology
Demonstration Centre
After the construction of the Friendship Farm was com-
pleted, the same construction team stayed in Mozambique
and continued to work on the construction of China’s Agricul-
tural Technology Demonstration Centre (ATDC). In 2007,
Hubei Lianfeng became the commercial contractor for the
ATDC. The ATDC was transferred to Mozambican govern-
ment (under the direct administration of the Ministry of
Science and Technology) in 2009 and the technical coopera-
tion period immediately started with 10 Chinese agricultural
experts selected by HFB.
Since 2009, it has demonstrated advanced Chinese tech-
nology and trained local farmers. The ADTC has also
become the platform for more Chinese agricultural compa-
nies arriving in Mozambique to seek new business opportu-
nities. 23 For example, another company from Hubei,
Hefeng African Agricultural Company Ltd., arrived in
Mozambique in 2012 and is working on rice cultivation in
Sofala. The ATDC has not only helped those companies
ﬁnd a suitable place for crop cultivation, but provided some
technical support, including renting agricultural machinery,
dispatching agricultural experts, and providing some inputs
to these companies. The ATDC in Mozambique has been
evaluated as one of the best Chinese ATDCs in Africa,
and its contractor, Hubei Lianfeng, has earned more fame
together with ﬁnancial opportunities from the Department
of Foreign Assistance, MOFCOM, for its overseas opera-
tions. For example, Hubei Lianfeng successfully tendered
for a bio-gas project in Mozambique in 2013, and another
agricultural technology cooperation project in Malawi in
2014. 24
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Assistance, MOFCOM, each center should have 10 Chinese
staﬀ. In August, 2013, eight experts were working at the Centre,
while the other two were working for Wanbao and Hefeng.
Almost all the agricultural experts are fromChinese state farms.
The shareholders are based in Hubei Lianfeng in Hubei Pro-
vince, where the director of the Centre comes from. Mozam-
bique’s Ministry of Science and Technology (MCT) is the
formal counterpart, and helps with the visa applications of Chi-
nese staﬀ and with the importation of all materials.
Although the ATDC is supposed by now to be self-
sustaining, both governments are committed to its continued
support. As one of the Mozambican government oﬃcials said:
‘‘the Centre will always be China–Mozambique ATDC, and
Chinese experts will always be here as long as they like”. 25
This suits all parties, as the ATDC has proved an important
platform for China–Mozambique development cooperation
and agribusiness investment. As the Director of the Mozambi-
can Ministry of Science and Technology put it, ‘‘I think this
kind of cooperation is better. It is diﬀerent from aid from
other developed countries. It’s visible and more eﬀective”. 266. CONCLUSION
This paper set out to address three principal research ques-
tions. First, ‘‘what are the roles of the Chinese State and busi-
ness actors in their engagement in Africa?; second, how, and to
what extent, are Chinese businesses in Africa regulated and
constrained by the Chinese central state and inﬂuenced by
the provincial state?; and third, what are the implications of
these micro-level encounters in terms of shaping and inﬂuenc-
ing the ways in which Chinese state–business led development
operates in practice?”
The widely held assumptions regarding Chinese engage-
ments in Africa are that they are overwhelmingly concerned
with the resources sector. In addition, it is believed that such
engagements are undertaken primarily by the large Chinese
SOEs and backed by Chinese state interests rather than the
dynamic forces of the market. However, the empirical evi-
dence demonstrates that, in practice, the picture is much more
complicated. The conventional view provides only a partial
explanation. This ﬂawed generalized explanation of China’s
role and impact in Africa increases the scope for misunder-
standing the role and impact of Chinese investment.
There needs to be a greater understanding of the relation-
ship between the Chinese state, mainly the Chinese central
and provincial governments, and China’s increasingly diverse
business sector. The case studies show how there is a prolifer-
ation of Chinese businesses in Africa acting independently or,
depending upon ownership, semi-independently of the Chinese
state. They are from diﬀerent provincial locations in China,
and with diﬀerent relations with the central state. Driven by
market pressures and the intensifying exposure to globaliza-tion, Chinese ﬁrms (both state-owned and private) principally
operate to their own commercial priorities, although govern-
ment and party ownership retain an inﬂuence on the policies
and structures within which these ﬁrms operate. Our research
shows, therefore, how the conventional wisdom of collusive
state–business relations is misleading.
As the cases from Zimbabwe and Mozambique show, a key
feature of China’s agribusiness is that the process of ‘‘going
global” is driven signiﬁcantly by China’s provinces, with their
own provincial commercial imperatives, business cultures, and
political directives. As the case studies show, business associa-
tions, notably the China–Africa Business Association (CABA),
have started to step in, providing better quality information,
training, and advice to Chinese ﬁrms. Overall involvement in
African agriculture has therefore been driven less by the govern-
ment in Beijing and much more by China’s provincial govern-
ments, businesses, and commercial associations.
If heterogeneity and lack of coordination deﬁnes the current
picture of state–business relations, this does not preclude some
level of coordination. Political and commercial oversight from
Chinese embassies can be important, as can networks formed
through various business associations. The ATDCs may act as
important platforms, and conduits for business investment,
often with strong links to particular provinces, and central
state ﬁnancing (Xu et al., 2016). ATDCs, with close links to
Chinese embassies thus become important vehicles for sustain-
ing control over Chinese companies in Africa.
In sum, the Chinese ‘‘state”, just as Chinese ‘‘business”,
does not exist in a singular, unitary form, with a standard-
ized or even coherent position. The ‘‘state” and ‘‘business”
take on many forms according to the way Chinese provinces
and businesses are organized, reﬂecting diverse political and
business cultures and forms of ‘‘state capitalism”. Contrary
to common perceptions, not all state–business relations in
Africa are the result of standard, party-driven, centralized
SOEs, but involve a multiplicity of actors, all negotiating
their positions. If ‘‘China” is not a homogenous bloc, it is
also important to remind ourselves that ‘‘Africa” is
diverse—experienced across multiple nation states, with dif-
ferent histories and experiences, and political–economic
imperatives—as the contrasts between southern African
neighbors, Zimbabwe and Mozambique show. Nor are Afri-
can players silent, passive, or impotent, but have active
agency (Mohan & Lampert, 2013; Scoones, Amanor,
Favareto, & Qi, 2016). As the case studies have shown,
much state–business interaction in African agriculture is
informal, unplanned, negotiated, decentralized, uncoordi-
nated and run through highly diversiﬁed routes, including
business associations, migrant networks, and a range of both
central and provincial level companies and enterprises. All
have ‘‘the state” embedded in them, as part of relationships,
but in diﬀerent ways and to varying degrees, adding to the
complexity and contingency in explaining China–Africa rela-
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